Date: 11/19/01 08:42:17 PM

Name: Benedict


Subject: Fw: Seminar: "Conceptual Analysis and the Challenge of Cognitive Diversity"

IP Address:

Nov 22nd 4:00V5:30pm
Department of Philosophy
University of Hong Kong

"Conceptual Analysis and the Challenge of Cognitive Diversity"
Dr Jonathan Weinberg
Department of Philosophy
Indiana University

A primary methodology in contemporary analytic philosophy is conceptual analysis V the considering of hypothetical cases in support of a purported analysis of some target concept of philosophical interest. The practice of this methodology, however, presupposes a wide agreement in our intuitions about such cases. This presupposition is an empirical one: do members of different groups really carve up the world with their concepts such as PERSON or GOOD or KNOWLEDGE in the same way? I present some data indicating that one can in fact find significant cross-group differences of intuitions (at least with the concept KNOWLEDGE), including cross-ethnic differences between subjects of an East Asian background and those of a Western/European background. I thereupon consider several possible responses the proponent of conceptual analysis might attempt to deploy, and show that they do not secure the requisite a priori basis for conceptual analysis.

Room 305 Main Building
Queries and Paper offers V Dr Timothy OLeary V